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Not So Special! Georgia Court of
Appeals Clarifies Special
Circumstance and Special Mission
Exceptions to Vicarious Liability
Samantha Thompson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever-increasing mobility of today’s workforce threatens
employers with a risk of vicarious liability for injuries arising from their
employees’ driving under the doctrine of respondeat superior.1 Although
common law protects employers from liability for injuries arising from
an employee’s commute to or from work,2 the special circumstance
exception and the special mission exception can create vicarious

*First, all praise and honor be to God for this opportunity. My sincere thanks to Professor
Stephen Johnson for his time and thoughtful feedback as my faculty advisor. I would also
like to thank my parents, Lynn and Freddy Thompson, whose unyielding love and support
catapulted me on this law school journey; my fiancé, Jordan Lipp, whose love and
consistent encouragement inspire me; and the family, friends, and mentors who spur me
on.
1. The doctrine of respondeat superior holds “an employer or principal liable for the
employee’s or agent’s wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or
agency.” Respondeat Superior, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). In Georgia, “to
hold a master [vicariously] liable for a tort committed by his servant, it must appear that
at the time of the injury the servant was engaged in the master’s business and not upon
some private and personal matter of his own; that is, the injury must have [been] inflicted
in the course [and scope] of the servant’s employment.” Clo White Co. v. Lattimore, 263
Ga. App. 839, 840, 590 S.E.2d 381, 382 (2003).
2. “As a general rule, a servant [] going to and from his work in an automobile acts
only for his own purposes and not for those of his employer, and consequently the
employer is not to be held liable for an injury occasioned while the servant is en route to
or from his work.” Jones v. Aldrich, Co., 188 Ga. App. 581, 583, 373 S.E.2d 649, 650
(1988).
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liability for a Georgia employer.3 These exceptions bring an employee’s
commute within the scope of employment when an employee acts under
a special circumstance or in furtherance of a special mission at the time
of an automobile accident; this creates vicarious liability for employers.
In DMAC81, LLC v. Nguyen,4 the Georgia Court of Appeals clarified
when a special circumstance or special mission creates vicarious
liability for employers.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Gary Cummings (Cummings) was commuting to work one morning
when he lost control of his vehicle and crashed into another car, killing
two individuals.5 Cummings was employed by McAlister’s Deli
(McAlister’s) in Macon, Georgia, where he worked on the grill line and
assisted with catering deliveries as needed.6 If Cummings was
scheduled to assist with catering, he would arrive at work early to
prepare the grill line before making deliveries. Cummings was paid
hourly after clocking in each day, required a general manager’s
permission to come in early, and received a cash payout to cover the
cost of gas when he assisted with deliveries.7 Although Cummings was
occasionally called in to assist on his day off, DMAC81, LLC (DMAC),
the owner of the Macon McAlister’s location, did not have a policy which
disciplined employees for refusing to assist on their days off.8
On the morning of the accident, Cummings was scheduled to begin
his regular shift at 10:00 a.m. However, the general manager called at
8:00 a.m. to ask Cummings to make a catering delivery.9 Although
Macon was under a state of emergency due to inclement weather,10

3. Vicarious liability refers to the “[l]iability that a supervisory party (such as an
employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an
employee) based on the relationship between the two parties.” Vicarious Liability,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
4. 358 Ga. App. 170, 170, 853 S.E.2d 400, 402 (2021).
5. Mr. Minh Nguyen was a passenger in the vehicle owned and operated by his
brother-in-law Thanh Nguyen at the time of the automobile accident. Both
brothers-in-law were killed in the accident. Br. of Appellee at 3–4, DMAC81, LLC v. Hong
Hoa T. Nguyen, 358 Ga. App. 170, 853 S.E.2d 400 (2021) (No. A20A1991).
6. DMAC81, LLC, 358 Ga. App. at 170, 853 S.E.2d at 402; Nguyen v. Cummings,
No. 2018-CV-69059, 2020 WL 8968730, at *1 (Apr. 3, 2020).
7. 358 Ga. App. at 170, 853 S.E.2d at 402–03.
8. Cummings, 2020 WL 8968730, at *2.
9. DMAC81, LLC, 358 Ga. App. at 170, 853 S.E.2d at 403.
10. Governor Nathan Deal issued a state of emergency for 83 counties, including
Macon, due to winter weather and snow. Severe Weather Team 2, WINTER WEATHER:
Governor Declares State of Emergency for 83 Georgia Counties, WSB-TV Atlanta 2 (Jan.
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Cummings felt he could not deny this request. Cummings agreed to
make the delivery and began his morning commute a little early to
prepare the grill line.11 Cummings sped and drove in the center lane, a
few minutes from work, when he lost control of his vehicle and
tragically killed two individuals parked in an emergency lane.12 A blood
test revealed marijuana and pain medication in Cummings’s system at
the time of the accident.13
The estate of Mr. Nguyen initiated a wrongful death suit in Bibb
County Superior Court against both Cummings and his employer,
DMAC.14 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged DMAC was liable for
negligent hiring and retention of Cummings, and vicariously liable for
Cummings’s negligent conduct under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.15 DMAC argued that common law rule immunizes employers
from liability when injuries arise during an employee’s regular
commute to work.16
DMAC moved for summary judgment alleging: the special
circumstance exception to the common law rule did not create vicarious
liability; the special mission exception also did not apply; and DMAC
was not negligent in its hiring and retention practices.17 The trial court
agreed that no special circumstance created vicarious liability.
However, the trial court found that a dispute of fact existed as to
whether the special mission exception applied; thus, it denied DMAC’s
motions for summary judgment relating to the special mission exception
and the alleged negligent hiring and retention practices.18 On
interlocutory appeal,19 the court of appeals considered DMAC’s three
17, 2018) https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/snow-possible-across-north-georgia-metroatlanta-today/684359723/.
11. DMAC81, LLC, 358 Ga. App. at 170–71, 853 S.E.2d at 403.
12. Id. at 171, 853 S.E.2d at 403; Cummings, 2020 WL 8968730, at *1.
13. DMAC81, LLC, 358 Ga. App. at 171, 853 S.E.2d at 403.
14. Cummings, 2020 WL 8968730, at *1; DMAC81, LLC, 358 Ga. App. at 170, 853
S.E.2d at 402.
15. DMAC81, LLC, 358 Ga. App. at 170, 853 S.E.2d at 402.
16. Resp. Br. Cross-Appellee at 7–8, Hong Hoa T. Nguyen v. DMAC81, 358 Ga. App.
170, 853 S.E.2d 400 (2020) (No. A20A1992).
17. Def. Reply Br. at 2–3, Nguyen v. Cummings, 2020 WL 8968730 (Apr. 3, 2020) (No.
2018-CV-69059).
18. Nguyen, 2020 WL 8968730, at *2–3.
19. An interlocutory appeal is an appeal that occurs before the trial court’s final
ruling on the entire case. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 (2021). Interlocutory Appeal, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The standard of review on appeal from a trial court’s grant or
denial of summary judgment is de novo. The facts and inferences drawn from them are
construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Centurion Indus., Inc. v.
Naville-Saeger, 352 Ga. App. 342, 343, 834 S.E.2d 875, 877 (2019).

1062

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

motions and affirmed the trial court’s decision in part and reversed the
decision in part. Ultimately, the court of appeals determined that
DMAC was not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior and
granted each of DMAC’s motions for summary judgment.20
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Employers can be held liable for torts committed by their employees
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. This common law doctrine
creates vicarious liability when two elements are satisfied: (1) an
employee causes injury to another; (2) while acting in furtherance of the
employer’s business and within the scope of their employment.21 An
employer can be vicariously liable if an injury arises at the time and in
the scope of an employee’s service to the employer, regardless of
whether the employer intended the tortious conduct to result.22 The
Georgia General Assembly codified this doctrine to create liability when
torts are committed by the employer’s command or in the prosecution23
and within the scope of the employer’s business.24
The test for vicarious liability turns on whether an employee is
serving its employer at the time of injury.25 For vicarious liability to
result, a tort must occur while an employee is accomplishing the ends of
employment.26 If an employee exercises their independent business and
is not subject to their employer’s immediate control at the time of
injury, employers are generally not vicariously liable.27 An employer is

20. DMAC81, LLC, 358 Ga. App. at 174–77, 853 S.E.2d at 405–07.
21. Littlefield Constr. Co. v. Bozeman, 314 Ga. App. 601, 603, 725 S.E.2d 333, 335
(2012).
22. Jones v. Aldrich Co., 188 Ga. App. 581, 582, 373 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1988). “A master
rarely commands a servant to be negligent, or employs him with the expectation that he
will commit a negligent or willful tort; but if the act is done in the prosecution of the
master’s business . . . the latter will be liable.” Id.
23. An employee is in prosecution of the employer’s business when they are “at the
time engaged in serving the master.” Id.
24. O.C.G.A. § 51-2-2 (2021). “Every person shall be liable for torts committed by his
wife, his child, or his servant by his command or in the prosecution and within the scope
of his business, whether the same are committed by negligence or voluntarily.” Id.
25. Hargett’s Tel. Contractors, Inc. v. McKeehan, 228 Ga. App. 168, 169, 491 S.E.2d
391, 393 (1997) (“The test is not that the act of the servant was done during the existence
of the employment, but whether the servant was . . . serving the master.”). Id.
26. Gassaway v. Precon Corp., 280 Ga. App. 351, 353, 634 S.E.2d 153, 155–56 (2006).
27. The employee’s conduct must be connected with the scope of employment for an
employer to be vicariously liable for the resulting injuries. Chorey, Taylor, and Feil, P.C.
v. Clark, 273 Ga. 143, 144–45, 539 S.E.2d 139, 140–41 (2000) (holding employer was not
liable when employee committed tort out of reasons disconnected from employment).
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not vicariously liable if an employee is engaged in a purely personal
mission at the time of injury.28
An employer generally will not be liable for an automobile accident
that occurs during an employee’s commute to or from work.29 For
example, in Gassaway v. Precon Corporation, 30 an employee caused an
automobile accident while commuting back to a job site after taking a
lunch break. The employee was found to be on a “purely personal
mission” and not acting within the scope of employment.31 Specifically,
at the time of injury, the employee ran a personal errand, not for the
benefit of his employer; did not act in obligation to his employer; did not
operate under his employer’s direction; and received the primary
benefits of his conduct. 32 However, there are exceptions to this general
rule. 33 If a commuting employee acts under a special circumstance or in
furtherance of a special mission at the time of an automobile accident,
vicarious liability can be created by the special circumstance exception
or the special mission exception.34
A. Special Circumstances Exception
Although an employee acts for their own purpose when commuting to
or from work, 35 a special circumstance can arise during the employee’s
commute which brings the commute within the scope of employment.36
A special circumstance can arise during an employee’s commute when
the employee conducts some manner of business, drives their
employer’s vehicle, or acts out of a duty to their employer while on

28. Centurion Indus., Inc., 352 Ga. App. at 347, 834 S.E.2d at 880. An employee is
engaged in a purely personal matter when they pursue an individual affair not arising out
of their employment. James B. Hiers & Robert R. Potter, Georgia Workers’ Compensation
Law and Practice § 5:22 (2021). Generally, employees are on a “purely personal mission”
when they are on a lunch break or commute to or from work. Id.
29. Whether evidence indicates an employee “act[ed] within the scope of his
employment . . . at the time of the accident” and creates vicarious liability is a question for
the jury. Hunter v. Mod. Cont’l Constr. Co., 287 Ga. App. 689, 691, 652 S.E.2d 583, 584
(2007).
30. 280 Ga. App. 351, 634 S.E.2d 153 (2006).
31. Id. at 352–53, 634 S.E.2d at 155–56.
32. Id. at 354, 634 S.E.2d at 156–57.
33. Hargett’s Tel. Contractors, Inc., 228 Ga. App. at 170, 491 S.E.2d at 393–94.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 170, 491 S.E.2d at 393.
36. Farzaneh v. Merit Constr. Co., 309 Ga. App. 637, 640–41, 710 S.E.2d 839, 843
(2011).
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call.37 This creates vicarious liability for the employer under the special
circumstance exception.
1. Conducting Some Manner of Business
An employee that conducts some manner of company business during
their commute acts within the scope of their employment.38 Relevant
caselaw establishes parameters governing what behavior is sufficient to
bring a commute within the scope of employment under the special
circumstance exception. Several conditions are indicative of whether
the employee was conducting “some manner of company business”39
during a commute.
Courts have examined the extent to which an employee’s accessibility
to their employer during their commute is sufficient to warrant the
special circumstance exception. An employee carrying an
employer-issued phone is not sufficient to create a special circumstance;
mere accessibility is not enough.40 However, evidence that an employee
is on the phone with their employer at or around the time of an
automobile accident can create a special circumstance; this is sufficient
to bring an employee’s regular commute within the scope of
employment and create vicarious liability.41 For example, an employee
in Clo White Co. v. Lattimore42 called their employer three times during
their commute. Several conditions supported the court’s determination
that the employee acted within the scope of employment during the
automobile accident: the calls were work-related; the calls occurred
outside of regular work hours; and the calls took place while the
employee was not “on the clock.”43 Since the employee “conduct[ed] the

37. Id. at 639–41, 710 S.E.2d at 843. “The law is clear that in the absence of special
circumstances a servant [] going to and from work in an automobile acts only for his own
purposes and not for those of his employer.” Clo White Co., 263 Ga. App. at 840, 590
S.E.2d at 383.
38. Id. at 840, 590 S.E.2d at 383. An employee’s performance of an act within the
scope of employment while commuting can create a special circumstance warranting the
imposition of an employer’s vicarious liability.
39. This language originates from the rule establishing the “master-servant” rule
that “[t]o hold a master liable for a tort committed by his servant, it must appear that at
the time of the injury the servant was engaged in the master’s business.” Id. at 840, 590
S.E.2d at 382.
40. Farzaneh, 309 Ga. App. at 641, 710 S.E.2d at 843 (employee’s mere possession of
a direct connection cell phone provided by their employer did not independently create a
special circumstance).
41. Hunter, 287 Ga. App. at 689–90, 652 S.E.2d at 583–84.
42. 263 Ga. App. 839, 840, 590 S.E.2d 381, 382 (2003).
43. Id. at 839, 590 S.E.2d at 381.
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[employer’s] business at the time of the accident,” the employer could be
vicariously liable for resulting injuries.44
Also, courts have examined whether the work location to which the
employee commutes impacts the analysis of whether the special
circumstance exception applies. Ultimately, courts have determined
that an employee’s commute to a work site rather than a central office
is not sufficient to warrant an application of the special circumstance
exception.45 An employee in Farzaneh v. Merit Construction Co., Inc.46
was instructed to arrive at a job site at 6:00 a.m. While commuting to
the job site, his automobile struck and severely injured a pedestrian.47
Ultimately, this commute was deemed a “purely personal matter,”
which fell out of the employee’s scope of employment under the general
rule.48 Thus, an employee’s commute to or from work does not warrant
an application of the special circumstance exception, regardless of
whether the employee commutes to a central office or a different
assigned work location.49
2. Driving an Employer’s Vehicle
An employee driving their employer’s vehicle at the time of an
automobile accident is presumed to act within the scope of their
employment, warranting an application of the special circumstance
exception.50 This presumption exists because employers typically
provide vehicles to enable employees to conveniently perform duties
within the scope of their employment;51 the provision of an employer
vehicle ultimately benefits the employer. However, this presumption
alone is not conclusive of an employer’s vicarious liability.52

44. Id. at 840, 590 S.E.2d at 383. Cotton v. Prodigies Child Care Mgmt., LLC, No.
A21A1457, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 99, at *7–8 (Ga. App Feb. 25, 2022) (holding sufficient
evidence was presented to create a jury question as to whether the special circumstance
exception applied when an employee scrolled through her phone to call her employer and
caused an automobile accident during her commute back to work after a lunch break).
45. Farzaneh, 309 Ga. App. at 642, 710 S.E.2d at 844.
46. 309 Ga. App. 637, 710 S.E.2d 839 (2011).
47. Id. at 638, 710 S.E.2d at 842. Cotton, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 99, at *7–10.
48. Id. at 640–42, 710 S.E.2d at 843–45.
49. Although courts do not apply the special circumstance exception when an
employee commutes to an assigned work location, courts do recognize a distinction when
an employee commutes between work locations once work has already begun for the day.
Id. at 643, 710 S.E.2d at 845 n.4.
50. Hargett’s Tel. Contractors, Inc., 228 Ga. App. at 170, 491 S.E.2d at 393.
51. Id.
52. Dougherty Equip. Co. v. Roper, 327 Ga. App. 434, 436, 757 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2014).
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Instead, a burden-shifting framework determines whether an
employer will be vicariously liable for the automobile accident.53 An
employer can overcome the presumption of liability by providing
uncontradicted evidence to establish that the employee did not act
within the scope of their employment at the time of an automobile
accident.54 For example, in Dougherty Equipment Co., Inc. v. Roper,55 an
employer presented sufficient evidence establishing that the employee
had not begun work at the time of an automobile accident; instead, the
employee merely drove the employer’s automobile to fulfill the duty of
arriving at work on time.56 Then, the burden to produce evidence
illustrating the existence of a special circumstance shifted to the
plaintiff.57 However, the plaintiff did not satisfy this burden, and the
court found the employer was not liable.58 As such, the presumption of
an employer’s liability, that an employee acts within their scope of
employment if they get into an automobile accident while driving their
employer’s car, can be overcome by sufficient evidence.59
3. Acting in Response to Being “On Call”
The special circumstance exception can also be applicable when an
employee is “on call” and acts in the fulfillment of a duty to their
employer at the time of an automobile accident.60 However, the test for
determining whether the special circumstance exception applies turns
on whether the employee responded to “an actual call at the time of the
accident.”61 An employee must undertake a duty at the employer’s
direction while being “on call” for the special circumstance exception to
apply; the employee’s on call status alone is not enough.62

53. Id. at 436, 757 S.E.2d at 888. “Under this framework, a presumption arises [that
an employee acted in the scope of employment at the time of collision] and the burden is
on the employer to show otherwise.” Littlefield Constr. Co., 314 Ga. App. at 603, 725
S.E.2d at 335.
54. Dougherty Equip. Co., 327 Ga. App. at 436, 757 S.E.2d at 888.
55. 327 Ga. App. 434, 757 S.E.2d 885 (2014).
56. Id. at 437, 757 S.E.2d at 889. Although an employee arguably fulfills a duty by
arriving to work on time, a punctual arrival is not under the direction of an employer or in
the performance of a service that can be considered in the prosecution of an employer’s
business. Id. at 436–37, 757 S.E.2d at 888–89.
57. Id. at 437, 757 S.E.2d at 888–89.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 436, 757 S.E.2d at 888.
60. Id. at 436–38, 757 S.E.2d at 888–89.
61. Id. at 437, 757 S.E.2d at 889.
62. Id.
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Evidence illustrating “an employee’s ‘on call’ status is, at best,
circumstantial evidence that [the employee] was acting in the scope of
employment.”63 To create vicarious liability, there must also be evidence
supporting that the employee was “called to duty and was acting
pursuant to that duty at the time of the [automobile] accident.”64 Thus,
if evidence establishes that an employee was both “on call” and acting to
fulfill a duty to their employer at the time of an automobile accident,
the special circumstance exception would create vicarious liability for
the employer. 65
4. Special Mission Exception
Vicarious liability is also created when an automobile accident occurs
while an employee acts on a special mission or errand under the
employer’s direction; this is called the special mission exception.66
Injuries resulting from a special mission considerably arise out of and
in the course of employment, creating vicarious liability for employers.67
The special mission exception is applicable when four requirements are
met.68 First, an employee must travel to or from either performing a
special mission or discharging a duty incidental to the nature of their
employment.69 Second, the employer must direct this mission or
errand.70 Third, the mission or errand must occur before or after
regular work hours.71 Finally, the automobile accident and resulting
injuries must arise from the employee’s commission of the special
mission.72 Relevant caselaw illustrates how courts apply this exception.
The special mission exception created vicarious liability in Patterson
v. Southeastern Newspapers, Inc.73 when an employer directed an
employee to assist with newspaper deliveries although the employee
was not scheduled for deliveries and did not have a set route. Since the
employee commuted upon completion of the route outside of regular
work hours (around 6:00 a.m.), at the direction and for the incidental
benefit of the employer, and an injury occurred while the employee was

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Aldrich Co., 188 Ga. App. at 583, 373 S.E.2d at 651.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
243 Ga. App. 241, 533 S.E.2d 119 (2000).
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en route, the resulting injuries considerably arose within the scope of
employment.74 Thus, the special mission exception applied, and the
employer was vicariously liable for the resulting injuries.75
The special mission exception does not apply when an employee “acts
for only his own purposes and not those of his employer.”76 Thus, an
employee’s commute to their usual place of work does not warrant an
application of the special mission exception, even if the employee’s
commute to work is “in the interest of” the employer.77 For example, an
employee in Hargett’s Telephone Contractors, Inc. v. McKeehan78 did not
act in the scope of his employment during a commute home after
customary hours, even though the employer incidentally benefitted
from his work prior to the commute. Since the employee’s commute was
not special, uncustomary, or within the scope of his employment, the
court refused to hold the employer vicariously liable for the employee’s
commute.79
Courts also do not broaden application of the special mission
exception to create vicarious liability when injuries arise from an
employee’s commute to a work site, as opposed to a central office.80 For
example, an employee in Farzaneh commuted directly from his home to
arrive at an assigned job site by 6:00 a.m.81 The court established that
“commuting to an assigned job site as he did every day of the work
week” was not special or uncustomary such as to warrant an
application of the special mission exception.82
Another consideration is relevant when determining whether the
special mission exception applies: whether an employer’s policy allows
them to discharge an employee for failure to perform the special
mission.83 However, even if an employee acts in furtherance of such a
policy, this alone is not independently dispositive.84 Instead, the policy
74. Id. at 241, 241–44, 533 S.E.2d at 119, 120–22.
75. Id. at 244, 533 S.E.2d at 122.
76. Aldrich Co., 188 Ga. App. at 583, 373 S.E.2d at 650.
77. Hargett’s Tel. Contractors, Inc., 228 Ga. App. at 170, 491 S.E.2d at 394 (refusing
to broaden the special mission exception to include an employee’s commute after working
uncustomary hours). As previously stated, an employee’s commute is a “purely personal
matter” and is not within the scope of employment. Farzaneh, 309 Ga. App. at 640, 710
S.E.2d at 843.
78. 228 Ga. App. 168, 491 S.E.2d 391 (1997).
79. Id. at 171, 491 S.E.2d at 394.
80. Farzaneh, 309 Ga. App. at 643, 710 S.E.2d at 845.
81. Id. at 638, 710 S.E.2d at 842.
82. Id. at 643, 710 S.E.2d at 845.
83. Gassaway, 280 Ga. App. at 353, 634 S.E.2d at 156.
84. Centurion Indus., Inc., 352 Ga. App. at 346, 834 S.E.2d at 879.
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is considered among other factors to determine whether an employee
acted within the scope of employment.85 Courts consider the extent to
which an errand is required by an employee’s job and the extent to
which employment is imperiled by an employee’s failure to complete the
errand.86 For example, in Gassaway,87 the court evaluated whether an
employee’s job would be imperiled by his failure to perform an errand.
The court decided that the errand was not required as part of the
employee’s job; 88 this influenced the court’s ultimate decision to not
apply the special mission exception.89
Courts are wary of expanding the special mission exception. “[A]
broad interpretation of the exception would devour the general rule of
no liability.”90 As such, an employee cannot unilaterally decide to
undertake a special mission; the special mission must directly result
from an employer’s instruction.91 Injuries must arise out of a special or
uncustomary request by the employer.92 Thus the special mission
exception only creates vicarious liability when injuries arise from the
tortious conduct of an employee, before or after regular work hours,
when the employee performs a special errand or discharges a duty that
is incidental to the nature of their employment, at the direction of their
employer.93
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
The court of appeals granted interlocutory review to determine
whether Cummings acted under a special circumstance or in
furtherance of a special mission at the time of the automobile accident
such as to create vicarious liability for DMAC.94 The court first had to
address the threshold issue: whether Cummings acted within the scope
of employment.95 The answer to this issue determined whether the
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Gassaway, 280 Ga. App. at 354, 634 S.E.2d at 156.
88. Id.
89. Other factors include the extent the employee acted under obligation to the
employer; whether the errand resulted from the employer’s direction; whether the
employee was the primary beneficiary of the errand; and whether the employee drove
their own automobile; and whether the errands were personal. Id. at 354, 634 S.E.2d at
156–57.
90. Hargett’s Tel. Contractors, Inc., 228 Ga. App. at 170, 491 S.E.2d at 394.
91. Centurion Indus, Inc., 352 Ga. App. at 347, 834 S.E.2d at 880.
92. Farzaneh, 309 Ga. App. at 643, 710 S.E.2d at 845.
93. Aldrich Co., 188 Ga. App. at 583, 373 S.E.2d at 651.
94. DMAC81, LLC, 358 Ga. App. at 171–72, 853 S.E.2d at 403.
95. Id. at 172, 853 S.E.2d at 403–04.
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court would proceed to evaluate the claim that DMAC was negligent in
its hiring and retention practices.96 The court broke its analysis into
four parts:97 it established principles of vicarious liability in Georgia;
evaluated if the special circumstance exception applied; assessed
whether the special mission exception applied; and considered the
negligent hiring and retention practices claim.
Next, the court established the general rules of an employer’s
vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior; specifically,
an employer shall be liable for torts committed by their employees
acting in furtherance of their business and within the scope of their
employment.98 The court also recognized the “longstanding general rule
that an employee is engaged in a purely personal matter while
commuting to or from work.”99 Ultimately, the court evaluated whether
the special circumstance exception or the special mission exception
applied in this case such as to create vicarious liability for DMAC.
A. Special Circumstances Exception
The court evaluated whether a special circumstance was created
when McAlister’s called Cummings in to assist with catering deliveries,
for the incidental benefit of McAlister’s, and Cummings felt unable to
decline the request.100 Several relevant factors were examined,
including whether Cummings carried work-related materials;
conducted business-related functions; received a stipend for the use of
his vehicle; or responded to a duty out of an on-call status at the time of
the automobile accident.101
The court evaluated the extent to which these relevant factors were
present at the time of Cumming’s automobile accident, ultimately
holding that none of the factors were present in this case.102 First,
Cummings did not carry work-related materials or conduct some
96. Id. at 176, 853 S.E.2d at 406. For an employer to be liable for negligent hiring or
retention, Georgia law “requires that (1) the employer knew or should have known in the
course of ordinary care, that the employee was incompetent, and (2) such incompetence
was the direct and proximate cause of damages to the complaining party under color of
the employee’s employment or during the employee’s work hours.” W. Melvin Haas, III et
al., Labor and Employment Law, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 211, 226 (2006).
97. DMAC81, LLC, 358 Ga. App. at 170, 853 S.E.2d at 402. The court began by
outlining the facts of the case, drawing all inferences in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party under a de novo standard of review. Id.
98. Id. at 172, 853 S.E.2d at 403–04.
99. Id. at 172, 853 S.E.2d at 404.
100. Id. at 172–73, 853 S.E.2d at 404–05.
101. Id. at 173, 853 S.E.2d at 404.
102. Id. at 174, 853 S.E.2d at 405.
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business-related manners at the time of the accident; no evidence
indicates that he used a cellphone at the time of injury.103 Next, since
Cummings was in the course of his morning commute, he had not yet
clocked in for the day; accordingly, he was not being paid for his time
when the accident occurred.104 Although Cummings ultimately received
money to cover the cost of gas used after making deliveries, he did not
receive a stipend for his commute time.105 Finally, the court established
that, although Cummings may have been on call to make a delivery
when the accident occurred, his on call status did not independently
create a special circumstance warranting DMAC’s vicarious liability.106
Since Cummings was already scheduled for a regular shift on the day of
the accident, he did not respond to a call at the time of injury; instead,
the injury arose while Cummings drove a regular commute to his
regular shift.107 The court ultimately determined that the factors
traditionally creating a special circumstance were not present in this
case; thus, the court upheld the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment as to vicarious liability under the special circumstance
exception.108
B. Special Mission Exception
Next, the court determined whether the automobile accident occurred
while Cummings was engaged in a special mission so as to create
vicarious liability for DMAC. Specifically, the court answered the
question of whether the request that Cummings arrive to his regular
job site early or assist with deliveries despite the inclement weather
was sufficient to warrant the application of the special mission
exception.109
First, the circumstantial evidence surrounding Cummings’s
automobile accident was compared to precedential case law. The court
ultimately determined that the request in Patterson was
distinguishable from the request that Cummings arrive to work
early.110 In Patterson, the employee was called in outside of his normal
schedule, at the special request of his employer, when the employee got
into an automobile accident on the way home from performing a special
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 173, 853 S.E.2d at 404.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173–74, 853 S.E.2d at 404–05.
Id.
Id. at 174, 853 S.E.2d at 405.
Id. at 174–75, 853 S.E.2d at 405–06.
Id. at 175–76, 853 S.E.2d at 405–06.
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mission.111 Accordingly, the special mission exception created vicarious
liability for the employer in Patterson.112 However, the request that
Cummings arrive early was distinguishable in that Cummings was
already scheduled to work a regular shift on the day of the accident; the
request was not special; and the accident occurred during Cummings’s
regular commute to work.113 The accident arose while Cummings was
“performing his duty to arrive on time”114 for a regular shift.115 Since
Cummings previously assisted with deliveries on several occasions, the
request for Cummings’s assistance was neither special nor
uncustomary.116 The request for Cummings to arrive early was treated
as a regular commute to work, so the special mission exception did not
apply; thus, DMAC was not vicariously liable for the resulting injuries
associated with the automobile accident.117
Additionally, the court assessed whether the area being under a state
of emergency due to inclement weather at the time of Cummings’s
automobile accident impacted the court’s analysis of whether the
special mission exception applied.118 However, the court emphasized
that the accident occurred while Cummings commuted to a regular
shift.119 Although inclement weather caused the area to be under a
state of emergency, this fact alone was not enough to “transform this
routine commute into a special mission.”120
After considering the facts surrounding Cummings’s automobile
accident, the court determined that the special mission exception did
not apply.121 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s decision
and granted DMAC’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of the
applicability of the special mission exception.122

111. Id. at 175, 853 S.E.2d at 405.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 175, 853 S.E.2d at 405–06.
114. An employee arriving to work on time considerably benefits the employee, not the
employer.
115. DMAC81, LLC, 358 Ga. App. at 175, 853 S.E.2d at 406.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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C. Conclusion
The court held that injuries resulting from Cummings’s commute did
not arise out of or in the course of Cummings’s employment with
DMAC.123 Since Cummings did not act in the scope of his employment
at the time of injuries, the court did not proceed to determine whether
DMAC was negligent in its hiring and retention practices; the court
granted DMAC’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.124
Ultimately, the special circumstance exception and the special mission
exception did not apply to the tragic injuries arising from Cummings’s
automobile accident, and DMAC was not vicariously liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.125
V. IMPLICATIONS
In this decision, the court of appeals refused to expand the scope of
the special circumstance exception or special mission exception when
determining the vicarious liability of an employer. Instead, the court
upheld the well-established principle absolving employers from
vicarious liability when injuries arise from an employee’s commute to
work. A different decision regarding either the special circumstance
exception or the special mission exception would have broadened an
employer’s liability; an employer’s risk of vicarious liability would have
continually expanded due to the ever-increasing mobility of the modern
workforce. Instead of broadening the application of these exceptions,
this decision establishes a clearer scope for determining when an
employee’s commute can subject an employer to vicarious liability.
Historically, an employee’s on call status at the time of an automobile
accident was indicative of whether the employee acted within the scope
of their employment at the time of injury. However, this case
establishes parameters which protect employers from an overextension
of this notion. Specifically, this case illustrates that, if an automobile
accident results while an employee is on call but not acting in service to
the employer, the automobile accident falls outside the scope of
employment. As such, the employer will not be vicariously liable for the
resulting injuries, even if the employee is on call at the time of the
automobile accident.
This decision also establishes parameters that protect employers
from an overextension of the special mission exception. Opening the

123. Id. at 174–76, 853 S.E.2d at 405–06.
124. Id. at 176, 853 S.E.2d at 406.
125. Reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2021. Id. at 170, 853 S.E.2d at 400.
Subsequently, certiorari was denied on July 20, 2021. Id.
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door to permit weather conditions to become a dispositive factor when
determining vicarious liability would pose a detrimental threat to
employers and the judicial system. Anytime an automobile accident
occurred during an employee’s commute, weather conditions could yield
an opportunity to hold employers vicariously liable for conduct outside
the scope of employment. Accordingly, the court’s decision to hold that
weather conditions are not an independently dispositive factor protects
employers from excessive vicarious liability.
Additionally, although Cummings felt uncomfortable declining the
request to assist with catering, the court refused to expand the special
mission exception since DMAC did not have a policy to discipline
employees for their refusal to come in on their days off. Cummings’s
discomfort was considered as a relevant factor, but this factor was not
independently dispositive. If the court held differently, an employer
could be held vicariously liable every time an employee alleged that
they felt discomfort when requested to come in. Ultimately, this
decision protects employers from an overexpansion of the special
mission exception.
The court “decline[d] to interpret the [special circumstance] exception
so broadly,” because the court recognized that “expand[ing] the special
mission exception to these facts would result in the exception
swallowing the rule.”126 Accordingly, this decision establishes
supplemental guidelines that limit when the special circumstance and
special mission exceptions apply.

126. Id. at 173, 176, 853 S.E.2d at 405, 406.

